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1 Introduction 
This extended abstract presents a logic, called Lp, that 
is capable of representing and reasoning with a wide va­
riety of both qualitative and quantitative statistical in­
formation. The advantage of this logical formalism is 
that it offers a declarative representation of statistical 
knowledge. Knowledge represented in this manner can 
be used for a variety of reasoning tasks. 
The logic differs from previous work in probability 
logics in that it uses a probability distribution over the 
domain of discourse, whereas most previous work (e.g., 
Nilsson [1], Scott et al. [2], Gaifman [3], Fagin et al. [4]) 
has investigated the attachment of probabilities to the 
sentences of the logic (also, see Halpern [5] for further 
discussion of the differences). 
The logic Lp possesses some further important fea­
tures. First, Lp is a superset of first order logic, hence 
it can represent ordinary logical assertions. This means 
that Lp provides a mechanism for integrating statistical 
information and reasoning about uncertainty into sys­
tems based solely on logic. Second, Lp possesses trans­
parent semantics, based on sets and probabilities of those 
sets. Hence, knowledge represented in Lp can be un­
derstood in terms of the simple primative concepts of 
sets and probabilities. And finally, the there is a sound 
proof theory which has wide coverage (the proof theory 
is complete for certain classes of models). The proof 
theory captures a sufficient range of valid inferences to 
subsume most previous probabilistic uncertainty reason­
ing systems. For example, the constraints generated by 
Nilsson's probabilistic entailment [1] can be generated by 
the proof theory, and the Bayesian inference underlying 
belief nets [6] can be performed. In addition, the proof 
theory integrates quantitative and qualitative reasoning 
as well as statistical and logical reasoning. 
In the next section we briefly examine previous work 
in probability logics, comparing it to Lp. Then we 
present some of the varieties of statistical information 
that Lp is capable of expressing. After this we present, 
briefly, the syntax, semantics, and proof theory of the 
logic. We conclude with a. few examples of knowledge 
representation and reasoning in Lp, pointing out the 
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advantages of the declarative representation offered by 
Lp. We close with a brief discussion of probabilities as 
degrees of belief, indicating how such probabilities can 
be generated from statistical knowledge encoded in Lp. 
2 Other Probability Logics 
Previous work in probability logic has investigated the 
attachment of probabilities to sentences. To appreciate 
the difference between this and the expression of statisti­
cal information consider the two assertions: "The prob­
ability that Tweety can fly is 0.75," and "More 
than 75Y. of all birds can fly . " The first state­
ment is an expression of a degree of belief. It is ex­
pressing the internal state of some agent-an agent who 
believes the assertion "Tweety can fly" to degree 0.75. 
It is not an objective assertion about the state of the 
world (i.e., an assertion that is independent of any be­
lievers). In the world Tweety can either fly or not fly­
there is no probability involved. The second statement, 
on the other hand, is making an objective true-false as­
sertion about the state of the world; i.e., in the world 
there is some percentage of birds that can fly and this 
percentage is either 75% or some other number.1 
This example shows that there is an essential differ­
ence between the attachment of a probability to a sen­
tence and the expression of a statistical assertion. As 
has been demonstrated in work presented at the pre­
vious uncertainty workshop (Bacchus [7]) probabilities 
attached to sentences, which have been the focus of pre­
vious work on probability logics, op. cit., are not capable 
of efficiently expressing statistical assertions. 
There has been some work similar to Lp. This work 
is discussed in more detail in Bacchus [8]. 
3 Types of Statistical Knowledge 
Statistical information can be categorized into many dif­
ferent types. The development of Lp was guided by a 
desire to represent as many different types of statisti­
cal knowledge as possible. The key consideration was 
the desire to represent qualitative statistical knowledge1 
i.e., not only the types of statistical .knowledge used in 
1 As stated it is clear that it is extremely unlikely that 
the actual percentage is exactly 75%. More likely that it is 
in some interval around 75%. Lp is also capable of making 
such interval assertions. 
statistics but also the types of "commonsense" statisti­
cal knowledge that would be useful in AI domains. The 
following is an incomplete list of some different types of 
statistical information that Lp is capable of expressing. 
Relative: Statistical information may he strictly com-
parative, e.g., the assertion "More politicians 
are lawyers than engineers . "  
Interval: W e  may know that the proportion i s  i n  a 
certain range, e.g., the assertion "Between 75% to 
99% of all politicians are lawyers." 
functional: We may know that a certain statistic is 
functionally dependent on some other measure­
ment, e.g., "The proportion of flying birds 
decreases as weight increases." This type of 
functional dependence in an uncertainty measure is 
prominent in the medical domain. 
Independence: We may know that two properties are 
statistically independent of each other. Work by 
Pearl and his associates has demonstrated the im­
portance of this kind of knowledge ([9, 10, 11]). 
4 Syntax and Semantics 
Lp is based on two fairly straightforward ideas. First, 
there is a probability distribution over the domain of 
discourse. This means that any set of domain individ­
uals can be assigned a probability. Through the use of 
open formulas (i.e., formulas with free variables) we can 
assert that various sets of domain individuals possess 
certain probabilities. An open formula can be viewed, 
as in lambda abstraction, as specifying a set of domain 
individuals-the set of individuals which satisfy that for­
mula. For example the open formula "Bird(x)" can be 
viewed as denoting the set of birds, i.e., the set of in­
dividuals that satisfy the formula. Sentences in Lp can 
be used to assert that the probability of this set (i.e., 
the measure of the set of individuals that satisfy the for­
mula) possesses various properties. For example, the Lp 
sentence "[Bird(x)]x > 0.9" asserts that the probability 
of the set of birds has the property that it is greater than 
0.9.2 
The second idea is to have a field of numbers in the 
semantics as a separate sort. With numbers as a sep­
arate sort the probabilities become individuals in the 
logics. That is, the probabilities become numeric terms3 
2This uncondition&l probability does not make much 
sense; it is through the use of conditional probabilities that 
meaningful statistical assertions can be made. For exam­
ple, the Lp sentence "[Fly(x)IBird(x)]x > 0.9" makes an 
auertion about the relative probability of flying birds r.mong 
birds, i.e., about the proportion of birds tha.t fly. 
3This means that the probabilities are :field-valued not 
re&l-valued. There are technical difficulties with using the 
re&ls instead of a. field of numbers. In particular, it is not 
possible to give a. complete axiomatization of the re&ls with­
out severely restricting the expressiveness of the logic. We 
can be assured, however, that the field of numbers will al­
ways contain the rational numbers, so the probabilities can 
be any rational number that we wish (in the range o-1, of 
course). 
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and, by asserting that these terms stand in various nu­
meric relationships with other terms, we can assert vari­
ous qualitative relationships between these probabilities. 
In the above example, '[Bird(x)]x' is a numeric term, 
and the sentence asserts that it stands in the 'greater­
than' relation with the numeric term '0.9'. The exis­
tence of numbers as a separate sort also allows the use 
of 'measuring' functions, functions that map individuals 
to numbers. An example of such a function is 'Weight', 
which maps individuals to a number representing their 
weight (in some convenient units). The measuring func­
tions greatly increase the expressiveness of the logic." 
5 Syntax 
We now present in a bit more detail the exact syntax 
of Lp. This description should give the reader a better 
idea of the types of sentences that one can form in the 
language. 
We start with a set of constant, variable, function, and 
predicate symbols. The constants, variables, and pred­
icates can be of two types, either field or object. 5 The 
function symbols come in three different types: object, 
field, and measuring functions. The measuring functions 
will usually have special names like Weight or Size. 
Along with these symbols we also have a set of dis­
tinguished symbols, including the following field sym­
bols: 1, 0 (constants), =, � (predicates), +, -, x, and 
..;-6 (functions). The symbol = is also used to represent 
the object equality predicate. Also included is the logi­
cal connective '!\', the quantifier 'V', and the probability 
term formers'[',']'. 
5.1 Formulas 
The major difference between the formulas of Lp and 
the formulas of first order logic is the manner in which 
terms are built up. 
TO) A single object variable or constant is an o-term; a 
single field variable or constant is an f-term. 
Tl) Iff is an n-ary object (field) function symbol and 
t1, ... , tn are o-terms (£-terms) then f (t1 • • •  tn) is 
an o-term (!-term). If v is an n-ary measuring 
function symbol and t1, ... , tn are o-terms then 
11(t1 . . •  tn) is an /-term. 
T2) If Q is a formula and i is a vector of n ob�ect vari­
ables, {:z:t, . . .  , :tn), then [Q]£ is an /-term. 
The formulas of Lp are built up in the standard man­
ner, with the added constraint that predicates can only 
apply to terms of the same type. The notable difference 
4 These "measuring" functions are c&lled random variables 
in statistics, but I avoid that terminology to eliminate possi­
ble confusion with the ordinary vtLri.ables of Lp. 
�When there is a danger of confusion the field symbols 
will be written in a bold font. 
6The division function is added by extending the language 
through definition. See [8] for the technical details. 
1Note, i does not have to include all of the free variables 
of a. Hit does not we have a term with free vtLri.ables which 
must be bound by other quantifiers or probability term fot­
men to produce a sentence. 
with first order logic is that f-terms can be generated 
from formulas by the probability term former. For ex­
ample, from the formula "Have(y, x)/\Zoo(x)" the f-term 
"[Have(y, x)/\Zoo(x)]x" can be generated. This term can 
then be used to generate new formulas of arbitrary com­
plexity, e.g., 
(Vyz) ( Rare(y) 1\ -,Rare(z) 1\ Animal(y) 1\ Animal(z) 
---> [Have(z, x) 1\ Zoo(x)]x > (Have(y, x) 1\ Zoo(x}]x) 
In this formula some of the variables are universally 
quantified while the 'x' is bound by the probability term 
former. The intuitive content of this formula can be 
stated as follows: if there are two animals one of which 
is rare while the other is not then the measure (proba­
bility) of the set of zoos which have the rare animal is 
less than the measure of the set of zoos which have the 
non-rare animal. 
Through standard definitions we add V, --->, :3, and the 
extended set of field inequality predicates, �. <, >, and 
E (denoting membership in an interval). We use infix 
form for the predicate symbols = and � as well as for 
the function symbols+, x, -,and+. 
Conditional probabilities are represented in Lp with 
the following abbreviation. 
Definition 1 
(ai/Jl.:r =dt [o: 1\ .B]:r + [.B],r, 
5.2 Semantic Model 
This section outlines the semantic structure over which 
Lp is interpreted. As indicated above it consists of a two 
sorted domain (individuals and numbers) and a probabil­
ity distribution over the set of individuals. What was not 
discussed was the need for a distribution over all vectors 
of individuals. This is necessary since the open formulas 
used to generate the probability terms may have more 
than one free variable. Hence one may need to examine 
the probability of the set of vectors of individuals which 
satisfy a given formula. 
An Lp-Structure is defined to be the tuple M: 
((O,Ro,Fo),(F,RF,FF),'Ill,{�in I n= 1,2 . . .  }) 
W here: 
a) (O,R0,F0): 0 represents a finite set of individual 
objects,8 Ro a set of relations, and Fo a set of 
functions, both of any arity. 
b) ( :F, Rt:, F F): :F represents a totally ordered field of 
numbers along with a set of relations, Rt:, and func­
tions, Ft:, on the field. 
c) 'Ill represents a set of measuring functions, functions 
from 0" to :F. 
d) { IJn I n= 1, 2, ... } is a sequence of probability func­
tions. Each �Jon is a set function whose domain in­
dudes the subsets of on defined by the formulas 
of Lp,9 whose range is :F, and which satisfies the 
'We restrict ourselves to finite domains to avoid the diffi­
culty of sigma additivity. This issue is dealt with in [8]. 
9This set of subsets can be shown to be a field of subsets 
[8). 
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axioms of a probability function (i.e., �J.n(A) > 0, 
IJn(A u B) = �(A) + JJ,.(B) if An B = 0, and 
�in(O") = 1). 
The sequence of probability functions is a sequence of 
product measures. That is, for any two sets A E 0" and 
B E 0"' and their Cartesian product A x B E on+m, if 
A E domain(�i .. ) and B E domain(�im), then A x BE 
domain(�in+m) and lin+m(A X B)= �in(A) X �(B). 
The product measure ensures that the probability 
terms satisfy certain conditions of coherence. For ex­
ample, the order of the variables cited in the probability 
terms makes no difference, e.g., (a]:e,y = [a]y,.,. Another 
example is that the probability terms are unaffected by 
tautologies, e.g., (P(�) 1\ (R(y) V ·R(y))](.,,y) = [P(�)J.,. 
It should be noted that this constraint on the proba­
bility functions is not equivalent to a restrictive assump­
tion of independence, sometimes found in probabilistic 
inference engines (e.g., the independence assumptions of 
the Prospector system (12], see Johnson [13]). 
5.3 Semantics of Formulas 
The formulas of Lp are interpreted with respect to the 
semantic structure in the same manner as first order for� 
mulas are interpreted with respect to first order struc­
tures. The only difference is that we have to provide 
an interpretation of the probability terms. As indicated 
above the probability terms denote the measure (prob­
ability) of the set of satisfying instances of the formula. 
In more detail: 
We define a correspondence, called an interpretation, 
between the formulas and the Lp-Structure M aug­
mented by the truth values T and 1. (true and false). 
An interpretation maps all of the symbols to appropriate 
entities in the Lp-Structure, including giving an initial 
assignment to all of the variables. 
These assignments serve as the inductive basis for an 
interpretation of the formulas. This interpretation is 
built up in the same way as in first order logic, with 
the added consideration that universally quantified ob­
ject variables range over 0 while universally quantified 
field variables range over :F. The only thing which needs 
to be demonstrated is the semantic interpretation of the 
probability terms. 
Let a be an interpretation of Lp. Let a(i/a), where 
a= (at, . . .  I a..) and i = (�t •. . .  I Zn} are vectors of indi­
viduals and variables (of matching type), denote a new 
interpretation identical to a except that (�1)"'(i/ii) ==a,, 
(i=1, ... ,n) . 
The probability terms are given the following semantic 
interpretation: For the f-term [o:],r, 
([a]:;;)�= 1-Jn{aia"(:i/ii) == T}. 
In other words, the probability term denotes the prob­
ability of the set of satisfying instances of the formula. 
Since IJn is a probability function which maps to the field 
of numbers :F, it is clear that [a],. denotes an element of 
:F under the interpretation a; thus, it is a valid f-term. 
6 Examples of Representation 
We can now give a indication of the representational 
power of Lp. By considering the semantic interpreta-
tion of the formulas it should be reasonably clear that 
the formulas do in fact represent the gist of the stated 
English assertions. 10 
1. More politician& are lawyer& than engineers. 
[Lawyer(x)1Politician(x)]x 
> [Engineer(x)IPolitician(x)]x. 
2. The proportion of flying birds decrea.&es with weight. 
Here y is a field variable. 
'v'y([fly(x)lbird(x) A weight(x) < y]x 
> [fly(x)lbird(x) A weight(x) > y]x) . 
3. Given R the property P i& independent of Q. This 
is the canonical hi-functional expression of inde­
pendence (see Pearl [9]). 
[P(:c)AQ(:c}IR(:z:)]., = [P(:z:)IR(z)].,x[Q(z)jR(:z:)].,. 
Thus Lp can represent finely grained notions of in­
dependence at the object language level. 
4. Quantitative notions from statistics, e.g, The height 
of adult male human• i1 normally distributed with 
mean 177cm and standard deviation 13cm: 
Vyz ([height(x) E (y, z) lldult..male(x)]x 
= normal(y,z,177,13)). 
Here normal is a field function which, given an 
interval (y, z) 11, a mean, and a standard devia­
tion, returns the rational number approximation12 
of the integral of a noJmal distJibution, with spec­
ified mean and standard deviation, ovel the given 
interval. 
7 Deductive Proof Theory 
This section outlines the deductive proof theory of Lp. 
The proof theory provides a specification for wide class of 
valid inferences that can be made from a body of knowl­
edge expressed in Lp. In particular, it provides a full 
specification for most probabilistic inferences, including 
Baysian inference, all first order inferences, as well as 
inferences which follow from the combination of quali­
tative and quantitative as well as statistical and logical 
knowledge. 
The proof theory consists of a set of axioms and rules 
of inference, and can be shown to be both sound. It can 
also be shown to be complete with respect to various 
classes of models. The proof theory for Lp is similar 
to the proof theory for ordinary first order logic. The 
major change is that two new sets of axioms must be 
introduced, one to deal with the logic of the probability 
10It. should be noted tha.t the aim is to give some illustta.tive 
examples, not to capture all of the nuances of the English 
assertions. 
110ne would probably want to constrain the values of y 
and z further, for example, y < z. 
1' A rational number approximation is returned since the 
numbers are from a totally ordered field, not necessarily the 
reals. It is well known that every totally ordered field contains 
the rationals (MacLane [14]). 
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function, and another set to define the logic of the field 
:F. 
The axioms include the axioms of first order logic (e.g., 
(15]) along with the axioms of a totally ordered field 
(MacLane [14]). There are also various axioms which 
specify the behavior of the probability terms. We give 
some examples of these axioms to give a indication of 
their form. 
Some of the Probability Function Axioms 
Pl) 'v'-z1 . . . 'v'-z,.a ---> [a]% = 1, 
where i == {:z:1, • • •  , :z:,.), and every :z:; is an object 
variable. 
P2) [a]:i! 2: 0. 
P3) [a]% +  [-,a]:i! == 1. 
P4) [a]:i! + (.B]:i! 2: (a V fi]z· 
P5) [a 1\ fiJz = 0---> (a]z + [.6]% = [a V fik 
The first axiom simply says that if all individuals sat­
isfy a given formula then the probability of this set is 
one (i.e., the probability summed over the entire domain 
is one). The other axioms state similar facts from the 
calculus of probabilities. 
Rule of inference 
The only rule of inference is modu8 ponens, i.e., from 
{a, a--+ fi} infer j3. 
If we also have an axiom of finiteness (see Halpern [5]) 
then the above axioms and rule of inference comprise a 
sound and complete proof theory for the class of models 
we have defined here (i.e., models in which 0 is bounded 
in size and where the probabilities are field valued). Let 
� be a set of Lp sentences. We have: 
Theorem 2 (Completeness) If � f= a, then � f- a. 
TheoremS (Soundness) If� f-a, then� f= a. 
Lemma 1 The following are provable13 in Lp: 
a) ([a:--+ 13]:i! = 11\ [13--+ a]:t = 1)--+ [a]z = [13k 
b) [a V ,B]z == [a]:i! + (.B]:i!- [a 1\ fil:i!· 
The following gives an indication of the scope of the 
proof theory. 
Example 1 Niluon '8 Probabilistic Entailment 
Nilsson [1] shows how the probabilities of sentences in 
a logic are constrained by known probabilities, i.e., con­
strained by the probabilities of a base set of sentences. 
For example, if [P 1\ Q] = 0.5, then the values of [P] a.nd 
[Q] are both constrained to be 2: 0.5. Nilsson demon­
strates how the implied constraints of a base set of sen­
tences can be represented in a canonical manner, as a 
set of linear equations. These linear equations can be 
used to identify the strongest constraints on the proba­
bility of a new sentence, i.e., the tightest bounds on its 
probability. These constraints are, in Nilsson's terms, 
probabilistic entailments. 
13That is, deducible directly from the axioms. 
Figure 1: A Bayes' Net 
These bounds are simply consequences of the laws of 
probability. And, since the proof theory of Lp is com­
plete with respect to the finite sample spaces that Nils­
son uses, these probabilistic entailments can be deduced 
from the proof theory of Lp. 
For example, if the base set in Nilsson's logic is 
{[P]=0.6, [P-+ Q]=0.8}, probabilistic entailment gives 
the conclusion 0.4 � [Q] � 0.8. If we write the sym­
bols P and Q as one place predicates, then in Lp the 
knowledge could be represented by the following set: 
{[P(:r)].,:;:; 0.6, [P(z)-+ Q(:r)]., = 0.8}. 
From this knowledge it is easy to deduce the bounds 
[0.4, 0.8] on the probability term [Q( :r )].,. 
Example 2 Bayuian Networks. 
Bayes' theorem is immediate in Lp. 
Lemma 2 (Bayes' Theorem) The following i& prov­
able in Lp: 
[ l [P']z [131a]z = ai,B x x [a);;· 
Consider the Bayes' Net in figure 1. If all of the 
variables X1-X4 are propositional (binary) variables one 
could write them as one place predicates in Lp. Hence, 
the open formula 'X1(;r:)', for example, would denote the 
set of individuals with property X 1. The Bayes' Net 
gives a graphical device for specifying a product form 
for the joint distribution of the variables X, [6]. In this 
case the distribution represented by the Bayes' Net in 
the figure could also be specified by the Lp sentence 
[Xt(z) A X2(z) A X3(z) A X4(z)]., 
[X4(z) IX3(:z:) A X2(z)]x X [XJ(x) IXt(x)]x 
x[X2(:t)IXt(x)]x x [Xt(:z:)]., 
It can easily be demonstrated that any probability 
distribution which satisfies this equation will also satisfy 
every equation of the same form with any number of 
the predicates negated (uniformly) . For example, the 
equation 
[X1(x) A ·X2(x) A XJ(z) A •X4(x)]., 
[•X4(z)IX3(z) A •X2(z)]., X (XJ(x)IXt(z)]., 
x[•X2(x)IXt(z)]., x [Xt(z)]., 
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will be satisfied by every probability distribution which 
satisfies the first equation. Furthermore, the proof de­
pends only on finite properties of the probability func­
tion, i.e., only on properties true of the field valued prob­
abilities used in the Lp-structure. Hence, by the com­
pleteness result, all such equations will be provable from 
the first via Lp's proof theory. 
This means that the behavior of the Bayes' net is cap­
tured by the first Lp sentence. That is, the fact that this 
product decomposition holds for every instantiation of 
the ptopositional vaiiables xi is captured by the proof 
theory. 
In addition to the structural decomposition Bayes' 
nets must provide a quantification of the links. This 
means the conditional probabilities in the product must 
be specified. In this example if we add the Lp 
sentences {[X1(z)]� = 0.5, [X2(x) IX1(x)]., = .75, 
[XJ(z)IXt(:z:)]., = .4, [X4(x)IX2(:r) A X3(:r)]., = .3}, 
we can then determine the probabilities of any of 
the individual variables given an instantiation of some 
of the other variables, e.g., the values of terms like 
[X1(z)IX2(z) A _,X4(z)]x. Again these probabilities will 
be semantically entailed by the product decomposition 
and by the link conditional probabilities. Thus, the new 
probability values will be provable from the proof theory. 
Of course the proof theory has none of the computa­
tional advantages of the Bayes' net. However, what is 
important is that Lp gives a declarative representation 
of the net. The structure embedded in the net is repre­
sented in a form that can be reasoned with and can be 
easily changed. There is also the possibility of automat­
ically compiling Bayes' net structures from declarative 
Lp sentences. Furthermore, the proof theory captures 
all of the Baysian reasoning within its specification, and 
offers the possibility of integrating Bayes' net reasoning 
with more general logical and qualitative statistical rea­
soning. Hence the proof theory gives unifying formalism 
in which both types of infexences could be understood. 
8 Degrees of Belief 
Besides their use in expressing statistical information, 
probabilities have an important use in expressing degrees 
of belief. One can assert that PROB[Fly(Tweety)] > .75, 
indicating that one's degree of belief in the assertion 
Fly (Tweety) is greater than 0. 75. Interestingly, Lp is 
not capable of expressing such probabilities. It can be 
shown that the probability of any sentence (i.e., formula 
with no free variables) is either 1 or 0 in Lp. This fact is 
interesting because, as was demonstrated in [7], probabil­
ity logics capable of assigning probabilities to sentences 
cannot (easily) represent statistical probabilities. Hence, 
these two types of probability logics have very different 
uses which coincide with their very different semantics. 
However, one advantage of a logic like Lp is that it 
can be used to generate statistically founded degrees of 
belief, via a system of direct inference (Kyburg [16], Pol­
lock [17]). Degree of belief probabilities generated in this 
manner have a number of advantages over purely subjec­
tive probabilities [18]; not the least of which is that they 
yield degrees of belief which are founded on empirical 
expenence. 
A preliminary system of statistically founded degrees 
of belief is presented in f19]. Fu:rther work in this area 
is in p:rogreu and will be :reported in (8]. The following 
example should serve to illustrate the basic idea behind 
this system. 
Example 3 Belie/ Formation 
Say we know that we have the following Lp knowledge 
base 
K B _ [Fly(x)IBird(x)]x > 0.9 - Bird(Tweety) 
That is, we know that more than 90% of all birds :fly, 
and that Tveety is a bird. Say that we want to generate 
a degree of belief about Fly(Tweety), i.e., Tweety's :fl.y� 
ing ability. We can accomplish this by considering what 
is know about Tweety (i.e., what is provable from our 
knowledge base), and then equating our degree of belief 
with the statistical probability term which results when 
we substitute a variable for the constant Tweety. This 
yields 
PaDB(Fly(Tweety)IBird(Tweety)) � (Fly(x)IBird(x)]x, 
which by our knowledge base is greater than 0.9. Seman� 
tically, this can be interpreted in the following manner: 
our degree of belief that Tveety can :fly, given that all 
we know about Tveety is that he is a bird, is equal to 
the proportion of birds that can :fl.y. The main complexi� 
ties arise when we know other things about Tweety, e.g., 
when we know that Tveety is a. penguin a.s well a.s a. bird. 
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